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RESUMEN: Este artículo examina cómo ha cambiado el ocio de los 
jóvenes en Europa occidental desde los años 50. Considera los efectos 
de la extensión de la etapa vital de la juventud, el ingreso en una era 
post-industrial y el notable aumento del gasto en ocio. El artículo ex-
plora las maneras en que las culturas juveniles se han convertido ahora 
en medios donde las relaciones y divisiones sociales son transformadas 
antes que reproducidas, y argumenta que esto es más plausible en rela-
ción al género, para algunas –aunque no todas– las divisiones étnicas, 
y totalmente implausible en relación a la clase social. Se aduce que las 
diferencias de clase en la socialización del ocio durante la infancia, que 
resultan en la adquisición de diferentes cantidades y tipos de capital 
cultural, junto a las relaciones sociales formadas entre pares sociales, 
permiten que las diferencias de clase se mantengan a lo largo de la 
etapa vital de la juventud, incluso aunque los jóvenes en la mayoría de 
trayectorias de clase compartan gran parte de su ocio.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Capital cultural; ocio; post-industrialismo; 
capital social; juventud.
IntroductIon
Childhood and youth are of special interest to leisure 
researchers because these are the life stages when indi-
viduals build-up stocks of leisure capital - skills, tastes 
and interests on which they base the rest of their leisure 
lives. Uses of leisure continue to change throughout the 
life course, but all subsequent changes are necessarily 
from foundations laid earlier-on. Leisure is of interest to 
sociologists of youth primarily for what is can reveal about 
social divisions: for example, whether class, gender and 
ethnic divisions are the basis for distinctive youth cultures 
and lifestyles that unify those inside while deepening their 
separation from others.
Today youth lasts longer than in the past. It is a longer pe-
riod throughout which individuals’ futures remain indeter-
minate. Young people may entertain hopes, aspirations and 
expectations, but they cannot be certain about the kinds of 
adults that they will become. Some youth sociologists (see 
below) contend that present-day young people’s leisure (or 
consumption) is eroding traditional social divisions which 
are being replaced by divisions and identities based on lei-
sure (or consumer) styles, and suggest that these identities 
may be retained throughout post-modern adulthoods. The 
following passages urge discrimination. They argue that 
youth leisure as a melting pot for traditional divisions is 
plausible in relation to gender, may apply to ethnic divi-
sions if an outcome of youth is inter-marriage, but are 
wholly implausible in relation to class.
Leisure is highly context dependent, so it is necessary to 
specify the times and places to which the following analysis 
refers. It is about young people in Western Europe since the 
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ABSTRACT: This paper examines how the leisure of young people 
in Western Europe has changed since the 1950s. It considers the 
effects of the extension of the youth life stage, the shift into a 
post-industrial era, and the steep increases in leisure spending that 
have occurred. The paper considers the ways in which youth cul-
tures have now become milieu where social relationships and divi-
sions are changed rather than reproduced, argues that this is most 
plausible in relation to gender, for some but not all ethnic divisions, 
and wholly implausible in relation to social class. It is argued that 
class differences in childhood leisure socialisation which result in 
the acquisition of different amounts and types of cultural capital, 
plus the social relationships formed among social equals, enable 
class differences to be maintained throughout the youth life stage 
even though young people on most social class trajectories share 
much leisure in common.
KEY WORDS: Cultural capital; leisure; post-industrialism; social 
capital; youth.
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The youth life stage
In the 1950s and 60s youth was popularly known as a 
brief flowering period (Klein, 1965). Young people be-
came full participants in youth cultures only after they 
left school and started earning wages (which was at age 
14-16 for the majority in Europe at that time). Post-war 
“affluence” meant that they could afford to buy transis-
tor radios, record players, singles, fashion clothing, and 
(by boys) personal motor transport, usually a scooter or 
motor bike. Girls usually earned less than boys: at that 
time sex discrimination was lawful and normal. Youth 
ended with marriage. At that time in northern Europe 
working class girls typically married in their late-teens 
or early-20s; the grooms were typically one or two years 
older. Very few young men actually became Teddy Boys: 
rather more probably adopted the later styles and became 
mods, rockers or skinheads, or more likely had these labels 
applied to them by others. These “types” were originally 
cultural constructs with which young people could align 
themselves, or find themselves typecast by others (see 
Cohen, 1972). For most young people, these types were 
just part of an exciting world within which they led their 
own more prosaic leisure lives (as portrayed, for example, 
in Willmott, 1966).
All these youth cultures were male-led. At that time teen-
age girls’ independent leisure was often spent in bedrooms: 
they needed boyfriends before they could “go out” (Griffin, 
1985). The youth cultures were all working class youth 
cultures. Being “on scene” was tantamount to being anti-
school and eager to leave at the first opportunity (Sugar-
man, 1967). Middle class young people who experienced 
an extended education were kept, or kept themselves, 
apart. Working class early school-leavers were earning 
the wages that gave them money to spend, and enhanced 
their status within their families.
Middle class and “square” were decoupled in the 1960s. 
University students led the way. Beatniks and hippies began 
appearing on campuses across the Western world. Sherry 
parties were “out”: beer, sex and drugs were “in”. Students 
became politicised and demonstrated in the original post-
war new social movements. Their first cause célèbre was 
for civil rights in the USA. This was followed by opposi-
1950s. Former communist countries are different in so far as 
communism itself, and the subsequent transition, have left 
legacies for young people in these countries. North America, 
along with Australasia, has different ethnic characteristics. 
Also, in the USA completion of high school at age 18/19 
became normal in the 1930s, and by the end of the 1960s 
over a half of young people were progressing into college. In 
most of Europe these levels of enrolment in education have 
been achieved only since the 1960s. The rest of the world, 
including the new industrial societies of Asia and Latin 
America, are different in that, in most of these countries, 
large proportions of their populations are still not absorbed 
into, and may never become part of, the modern economic 
sectors. Also, these countries have modernised directly into 
a late-20th and early-21st century world of global capitalism, 
markets, media and consumer cultures.
The time period dealt with below is 1950s onwards. Since 
then and up to the present-day, probably the best known 
European studies of young people’s leisure have been those 
conducted in the UK, at Birmingham University’s Centre for 
Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) in the 1960s and 70s 
(Hall and Jefferson, 1976; Mungham and Pearson, 1976). 
The central claim of these studies was that the new post-
war working class youth cultures were to be understood as 
forms of class resistance, offering “magical” solutions to the 
problems of growing-up working class amid the post-war 
economic and social changes. Britain was the source of 
these studies probably because the country was among the 
fastest to recover from the war, and before the war it had 
one of the world’s highest standards of living. Other West 
European countries soon caught up and had their own 
versions of the Teddy Boys, mods, rockers and skinheads. 
The accuracy of the CCCS accounts of post-war youth 
cultures continues to be debated. The authors claimed to be 
supportive of ethnography, but their own fieldwork, at best, 
was superficial. This is one reason why there are continuing 
controversies about the extent and ways in which youth cul-
tures have changed since the 1960s (see Muggleton, 2000, 
2005). However, there is no dispute that there have been 
major changes. The changes themselves, all with implica-
tions for young people’s leisure, and the forces responsible, 
have been broadly the same throughout Western Europe:
•  The lengthening of the youth life stage. 
•  The shift into a post-industrial age. 
•  Vast growth in leisure spending.
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and loans, to sustain thriving town- and city-centre night-
time economies. They participate from their teenage years, 
through their 20s, and often into their 30s (Hollands, 
1995). Youth ends later than in the past, but if anything 
it now starts at younger chronological ages than formerly. 
This is indicated if not caused by the energetic marketing of 
youth fashions and music to the pre-teens. Pocket money 
has made the “tweenies” a sought-after commercial 
market segment. An outcome is that there are now age 
grades within the youth life stage and in youth leisure-
time cultures. Arnett (2005) has labeled 18-25 as the age 
of “emerging adulthood” in North America, where the term 
“youth” remains firmly attached to the high school years, 
whereas in Europe “youth” remains an acceptable and 
understood descriptor of the now extended life stage. Ar-
nett portrays America’s 20-somethings as deliberately 
pausing growing-up in order to extend the period of life 
when they are free from adult responsibilities. Others 
would describe the age group’s situation as being unable 
to advance due to their inability to access the necessary 
jobs and housing. However, it appears that everywhere the 
20-somethings are at ease with their extended transi-
tional life stage situations (see Devadason, 2007).
As in all life stages, “youth” are a constantly flowing 
stream. They move on and pass through. Nowadays they 
stay longer, so membership of the life stage group is re-
plenished more slowly, and there are successive steps 
within youth. “Mature” 18 year olds do not mix with 
14 year old “kids”, and the 20-somethings do not hang 
around with mere teenagers. An outcome is greater di-
versity and less rapid obsolescence in youth scenes, tastes 
and fashions. Another effect of the lengthening of this 
life stage is that most participants are legally adult - able 
to vote and to access the full range of adult goods and 
services. Some older members of the life stage group earn 
good adult salaries. They, rather than teenagers, are the 
prime targets of consumer industries, and they serve as 
role models for younger young people.
Post-industrial society
The extension of youth has been just one part of a wider 
constellation of changes leading into a post-industrial age. 
As the name implies, economic change has been at the 
heart of this wider historical shift. Employment in ex-
tractive and manufacturing industries has declined. Jobs 
tion to the Vietnam War which spread student protests 
into Europe. The aims gradually widened into  rejection of 
the entire capitalist-industrial- military system. Academics 
tried to understand all this (see Feuer, 1969, Roszak, 1970). 
One point of agreement was that these student move-
ments were quite different from the working class youth 
cultures of that era. The student movements attracted as 
much if not more academic and media attention as their 
working class counterparts, though at that time in Europe 
only small minorities of young people were attending uni-
versities. A new post-war middle class generation was then 
being born (Inglehart, 1977), but at the time this was not 
properly understood. One similarity between working and 
middle class youth experience was that in both cases it 
tended to end abruptly - on marriage for the working class, 
and on graduation for students after which they embarked 
on middle class careers.
Today youth is a different kind of life stage. University stu-
dents have become the largest single youth career group 
in country-after-country. Chances of obtaining full-time, 
permanent adult employment have receded. It now takes 
until age 29 before the majority in the EU27 occupy such 
jobs (Social Agenda, 2009). Typical ages of marriage and 
first child births have risen in northern Europe to late-
20s or early-30s for women, and slightly older for men. 
In southern Europe it remained normal for young people 
to remain at home with their parents until they married 
in their late-20s or 30s throughout the post-war decades 
(see Holdsworth, 2005). The expectation in the north at 
that time was that eventually the “backward” south would 
catch-up, but in practice it is the north that has changed 
and its young people’s family and household formation 
practices have become southern, except that in the north 
young people still leave their parents’ homes earlier to live 
singly, in shared housing or to cohabit – now a normal 
prelude or alternative to marriage (see Heath and Kenyon, 
2001; Rugg et al., 2004). Youth family and housing careers 
have become far more complicated than when a couple 
would leave their parents’ homes, marry, start life in their 
marital home, and both lose their virginity, all within a 
single day (Leonard, 1980).
Exclusion from adult jobs has not impoverished Europe’s 
teenagers and 20-somethings. The majority have sufficient 
income from parents (the so-called “bank of mum and 
dad”), part-time and temporary jobs, and student grants 
ARBOR Vol. 188 754 marzo-abril [2012] 327-337 ISSN: 0210-1963 doi: 10.3989/arbor.2012.754n2006
754Nº
330
TH
E lEISu
R
E O
F YO
u
N
G
 P
EO
P
lE IN
 C
O
N
TEM
P
O
R
A
R
Y SO
C
IETY
The most rapid employment growth has been in the ma-
nagement and professional grades. Many of these jobs are 
in financial and business services. Others are in public ad-
ministration, health care and education. In manufacturing 
highly qualified scientists and technologists who design and 
control mechanised production have replaced thousands of 
manual workers. The manual working classes have become 
minorities in the advanced post-industrial societies. This 
means that most children are now reared in middle class 
homes. The parents have middle class aspirations for their 
children and want them to succeed in education. This is 
the context in which progressing through upper secondary 
and into tertiary (what used to be called higher) education 
has become normal. The USA has now been overtaken in 
participation rates by some European and new industrial 
countries such as Singapore and South Korea. The number 
of graduates entering the labour market has expanded 
in all world regions (Morley, 2007). This has made highly 
qualified labour plentiful, and often cheap as well (Brown 
et al., 2010). Students are now core participants in youth/
young singles scenes. An extended education is a condition 
for remaining “in”; a total reversal of the situation in the 
1950s. Secondary school pupils hope to become part of 
the student lifestyle, which is quite likely to be retained 
after graduation, especially by those who become part of 
the so-called €1,000 generation (see Chiotaki-Poulou and 
Sakallariou, 2010; Cuzzocrea and Tavani, 2010).
There are still distinguishable working class youth cultures. 
In the UK “chavs” express defiance (as Teddy Boys once 
did) simply by hanging around in trainers, tracksuits and 
hoods, or alternatively by wearing Burberry and “bling” 
(cheap ostentatious jewelry) (McCulloch et al., 2006; 
Nayak, 2006). The difference vis-à-vis earlier times is that 
these are no longer mainstream youth scenes. Mainstream 
youth cultures, like mainstream consumer cultures, are 
now middle class. There is also a lower class, sometimes 
described as an underclass or excluded, where children are 
reared in households with no-one in regular employment, 
in neighbourhoods where such households are common. 
The young people tend to disengage from education early. 
The girls may become single teenage mothers. Otherwise 
they hang about with local boys on the streets, take “fid-
dly jobs”, commit petty offences, and sometimes become 
problem drug users (different from the “sensible” recrea-
tional drug use that is now mainstream) (see Parker et al., 
2002). These young people find themselves unwanted in 
have been lost to new technology or exported to lower 
wage-cost countries. There has been a corresponding and 
compensating growth in service sector employment. Many 
of these new jobs require qualities and skills traditionally 
considered feminine. This is just part of the explanation of 
increasing rates of labour market participation by women. 
The contraceptive pill, available since 1961, has also played 
a part, giving women greater control than ever before over 
their own fertility and sexuality. Women today are spending a 
greater proportion of their adult lives in employment than 
during the industrial age. This is the context in which they 
have demanded, and been given, the legal right to equal 
opportunities and equal pay for work of equal value.
Towards the end of the 20th century the first cohorts of 
boys and girls grew up in households with working mothers. 
The girls have taken it for granted that they will embark on 
long-term employment careers. Nowadays young women 
take maternity leave (another legal entitlement) instead of 
terminating their employment. This is the context in which 
girls have begun out-performing boys at all levels in edu-
cation, starting in elementary school, continuing through 
secondary education, then resulting in female majorities 
among students in higher education. On entering the la-
bour market they are now as successful as young men in 
terms of their chances of obtaining jobs and their rates of 
pay, and this equality continues for as long as the women 
remain childless.
The shift of employment into service sectors has led to 
traditional working class jobs being partly replaced by new 
service sector proletarian occupations in retail, hospitality, 
call centres, security firms, and as nannies, cleaners and 
gardeners in the private homes of the better-off (Bernadi 
and Garrido, 2008). Students often take these jobs as 
part-time or temporary occupations, but for others there 
is no escape from this kind of work. Traditional working 
class masculinity, which was required to perform heavy 
industrial work, is becoming obsolete, though many 
young working class males continue to aspire to this kind 
of employment (McDowell, 2003), and may preserve 
traditional masculine identities in their leisure (Blackshaw, 
2003). However, they are likely to encounter a shortage of 
traditionally feminine young women, and those that 
remain confront severe shortages of reliable male working 
class “breadwinners”. Hence the pressure on young women 
to make themselves economically independent.
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total population compared with mainland West European 
countries. Even so, in London around 40% of current 
working age residents were born outside the UK (Centre 
for Economic Performance, 2010). In the East European 
villages, towns and cities where future migrants are born 
and reared, migration is now a normal everyday topic of 
conversation and part of the life planning of young people. 
Migrants are typically young adults – not teenagers but 
in their 20s or 30s – and they have become substantial 
parts of the populations in the places where they settle. 
They compete for jobs, housing and other services with 
the local populations. Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2009) 
claim that they are thereby helping to spread insecurity 
into Western Europe, and are simultaneously creating new 
trans-national communities of young migrants. Some are 
pendulum migrants who return to their home countries. 
Some stay: this always depends to some extent on the 
kinds of employment and accommodation that they are 
able to obtain, and whether romantic attachments are 
formed. Some who stay may assimilate, but this is likely 
to take at least a generation and to involve inter-marriage. 
Unlike the “new world”, the relatively old ethnic nations 
of Europe are difficult to enter. Hyphenated identities are 
not really possible. People from local families will insist 
that they are the real Germans, French, British, Spanish 
and so on.
Nevertheless, many young people in Western Europe 
now grow up in multi-cultural environments. Students 
in higher education study alongside students from other 
countries, some of whom are from other EU countries, 
supported by EU Erasmus programmes. They will proba-
bly work alongside migrants. This fraternisation may or 
may not extend into leisure interests and spaces, but 
irrespective of inter-ethnic friendships, globalisation has 
introduced multi-cultural variety into the leisure offer in 
all parts of the world: the types of restaurants and foods 
that are available in city centres, the range of beers, 
wines and spirits available in bars, the fashion scenes, 
the kinds of music and entertainers. Top sport is now 
played for global crowds of spectators via the media. 
Europe’s major football clubs compete season-long in 
Euro-competitions. Manchester United’s travelling fans 
have become as familiar with Madrid and Barcelona as 
with Newcastle and Sunderland. This de-localisation of 
everyday leisure is one aspect of globalisation in the 
post-industrial age.
mainstream employment and excluded by the door poli-
cies of mainstream leisure facilities (see MacDonald and 
Shildrick, 2007).
Young men and women interact on equal terms in main-
stream youth scenes. The teenage girls’ bedroom culture 
is now a thing of the past. Groups of young women go 
out independently and claim public space – once a male 
prerogative – in town and city centres, bars and sports 
centres. An indication of the new times is gender conver-
gence in rates of smoking, drug and alcohol consumption 
(Sweeting and West, 2003). Young males and females are 
equally likely to have paid employment. They have similar 
sources and levels of income. Couples go out together and 
share expenses: one no longer “takes” the other.
The shift from industrial into post-industrial economies 
has driven broader social changes. The economic changes 
themselves have several sources which include economic 
growth itself, the latest generation of information and 
communication technologies (ICT) and globalisation (to 
which ICT has contributed). Globalisation refers to the 
increased inter-country flows of goods, services, capital, 
people and information, and the creation of trans-national 
institutions which regulate these flows.
Movement by people is a flow that concerns us here. 
All West European countries are now net immigration 
countries. More people are moving because they are more 
aware than in the past of opportunities in other parts of 
the world, and simply because they can. The main flow 
today is from poorer to richer countries. Refugees from 
wars and political persecution join economic migrants 
in aiming for the relatively rich West. Former imperial 
countries attract migrants from former (and still remain-
ing) colonies. Other migrants travel from all parts of the 
world. Since 2004 when the European Union expanded 
eastwards, there has been a new upsurge of migration 
from east into west Europe, and from 2012 this flow will 
be unrestricted.
Migration flows become self-sustaining. Trans-national 
networks are created which assist the movement and set-
tlement of further migrants. A result is that some European 
towns and cities that have become migrants’ favoured 
destinations are extremely multi-cultural. The UK does 
not have a particular large proportion of migrants in its 
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centration of these rises among the better-off. These have 
been new tendencies, somehow associated, although the 
ways remain unclear, with the shift into a post-industrial 
age. The leisure industries that have benefitted most from 
the increases in leisure spending are out-of-home dining 
and drinking, communications, and tourism. All age groups 
are now spending much more than in the past on these 
leisure goods and services. Young people have simply been 
part of general trends, but because young people have yet 
to acquire adult responsibilities, they can devote unusually 
large proportions of their incomes to leisure, and they have 
become a major market segment for the relevant leisure 
industries.
“Going out” has always been a pivotal youth leisure ac-
tivity. The change over time has been in the amounts of 
money spent when young people go out. Young teenagers 
who merely “hang around” nowadays expect to have the 
money to purchase confectionery and soft drinks. Older 
teenagers might formerly have met in a coffee bar, gone to 
the cinema or a dance palais. Girls often entertained same-
sex friends in bedrooms where they played records, applied 
cosmetics and tried on clothes. A real night out is now a 
far more expensive affair (see Hollands, 1995). It involves 
taxi fares, food at some point, drinks in a bar throughout 
an evening, which will be a prelude to “clubbing” and 
the possible purchase of soft drugs. It is necessary to be 
fashionably attired for these occasions. “Binge drinking” 
is now normal youth leisure throughout Europe. Beer has 
become young people’s favourite alcoholic beverage across 
the continent, though ready-mixed drinks (with a spirit 
base) are also popular. At least mild intoxication is con-
sidered a condition for real fun (Jarvinen and Grundelach, 
2007). Night-time economies that keep Europe’s city cen-
tres lively well into the wee small hours every weekend are 
sustained by young people’s spending. As Hollands (1995) 
points out, this leisure behaviour continues throughout a 
prolonged youth life stage. Youth is no longer a brief tran-
sitional phase in which socio-psychological developmental 
tasks (like finding a mate) are accomplished after which 
the individuals move on. Youthful behaviour continues 
throughout the 20s and often well beyond.
Spending on communications has risen alongside ICT en-
larging the ways in which it is possible to send and receive 
communications. It is necessary to have been born during 
or since the 1990s to have grown up amid the present 
Leisure
Leisure studies was formed as an academic field in the 
1950s and 60s. One of its major claims was that leisure 
had grown, was still growing, and that this growth would 
continue. Thus leisure was becoming a more important 
part of people’s lives and of society-at-large. Hence the 
case for treating leisure seriously.
Predictions that leisure would continue to grow have 
proved correct, but the founders of leisure studies did not 
envisage exactly how leisure would grow over the next 
40-50 years. They expected leisure spending to increase, 
but some of the gains from future economic growth were 
expected to be taken in the form of increased leisure time. 
This had been the pattern since the early days of industria-
lism and up to the 1960s. The normal working day, week 
and year had all been trimmed. In the event, the shift into 
a post-industrial age has seen an end to the former 
historical decline in normal hours of work. Another histori-
cal turn-around is that the management and professional 
grades now work longer, on average, than the lower level 
staff who they control. The higher socio-economic strata 
are no longer time privileged. All the benefits of economic 
growth have been taken in the form of higher incomes, 
and in Western countries pay has risen fastest in the 
occupations that were already better-paid, that is, managers 
and professional employees. Attempts in Germany and 
France to reduce hours of work so as to create more jobs 
and reduce unemployment have proved unsuccessful (see 
Roberts, 2006, 2007 for a review of the relevant evidence). 
The explanations of these trends are still debated, but one 
outcome is crystal clear: huge growth in leisure spending, 
mainly by the middle classes who have the higher incomes, 
and who are now as numerous as the working classes.
In the UK leisure spending has risen five-fold in real terms 
since the 1950s; that is, at more than three times the rate 
of the overall growth in spending. The more prosperous 
a country, the higher the proportion of its spending is 
devoted to leisure goods and services. The higher income 
groups within countries consistently spend the highest 
proportions of their incomes on leisure. All this was true 
before and throughout the 1950s and 60s. The subsequent 
explosion in leisure spending has been due to an apparent 
shift in time/money preferences towards all the benefits of 
growth being channeled into higher incomes, and the con-
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which they may try to combine earning and pleasure. This 
has become a modern and mass equivalent of the “grand 
tour”, originally undertaken by youth from aristocratic 
European families.
Young people’s leisure has become intensely commer-
cial, meaning that full participation requires substantial 
financial outlays. The main providers are all commercial 
businesses. Many young people are involved in voluntary 
associations which organise sport, artistic production and 
consumption, or undertake voluntary work. Some young 
people join political and religious organisations. However, 
all these forms of youth leisure are marginal (relatively 
small whether size is measured in the proportions who 
take part, or time or money spent) compared with what 
commerce offers. Traditional youth movements and clubs 
play virtually no part in present-day youth’s leisure. These 
movements had their heyday before 1939. Most have sur-
vived, and some have flourished by targeting children, the 
under-14s, after which the age group is seeking something 
more grown-up.
Some young people are excluded or remain on the margins 
of today’s commercial mainstream. This may be by choice 
or parental pressure, or more likely due to straight-forward 
lack of the necessary money to spend. It is necessary to 
spend in order to be a full participant in today’s normal 
forms of youth leisure. This is a big change since the 1950s 
and 60s. Youth is now an extended life stage, in which 
most young people are on or are trying to join middle class 
life trajectories. Their leisure is intensely commercial and 
access is rationed by the ability and willingness to pay.
dIscussIon
Social divisions
We noted in the introduction that sociology’s principal 
interest in young people’s leisure is its potential con-
tribution to knowledge about social divisions, and some 
students of youth cultures claim that these milieu are 
currently weakening divisions that were formed during the 
industrial era and creating alternatives. They have focused 
rather narrowly on night-life where music is played and 
fashions are displayed. They note the plethora of styles 
range of technologies. Spending is on hardware, software, 
subscriptions and user charges.
•   Electronic  games were  once  played  only  on  dedicated 
consoles, on a household TV screen, or in an arcade. 
These are all still common, but games can also be played 
on a hand-held device including mobile phones and over 
the internet. The games become forever more sophisti-
cated technically, and more challenging. They are now 
part of a normal childhood and play is likely to continue 
throughout life.
•   Multi-channel  television  makes  it  possible  to  watch 
any kind of programme at any time during any day or 
night.
•   The mobile phone is now a multi-functional device ena-
bling users to communicate by voice or text, to transmit 
and receive images, to listen to music, and to access the 
internet. Children now grow-up in a world where a mo-
bile is absolutely essential in order to keep “in touch”.
•   The  internet  can  be  used  for  person-to-person  com-
munication (email), to obtain information for work, 
study or a leisure interest, to make purchases, to sell 
unwanted items, to conduct bank transactions, to 
download images, text and sound, to join interactive 
online communities, and to enjoy a second life in virtual 
reality. The internet has undermined certain leisure in-
dustries (recorded music for example) but it has created 
even more new ways of doing business. Among others, 
the internet has facilitated a huge expansion of the 
gambling industry.
Tourism is now one of the world’s largest industries. 
Europeans now grow up regarding travel as a necessity. 
The motor car has become an essential acquisition while 
en route to adulthood. Present-day rites of passage include 
attending a pop concert, clubbing, a major pop festival, 
and holidaying abroad without adult supervision. There are 
travel companies, hotels and entire resorts which cater for 
the youth and young singles markets. The basic ingredients 
are cheap travel and accommodation, sunbathing, beach 
games, and opportunities to drink and dance throughout 
every night. West Europeans may also travel to study. 
They may make long-haul extended trips during gap years 
prior to, during or after university. These are excursions on 
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the labour market have converged. In youth cultures the 
sexes relate on equal terms. It is plausible, though not 
inevitable, that this symmetry will continue through family 
and household formation with males and females sharing 
the tasks of earning, housework and child care.
In respect of ethnic divisions, youth cultures will act as a 
melting pot if the different groups inter-mingle and even-
tually inter-marry. This seems most likely if the ethnicities 
are all European or at least Western. If there are physical 
and/or deep cultural differences in language, religion and 
preferred uses of leisure, especially if minorities do not 
embrace alcohol and night-life in the manner of European 
youth, their respective leisure practices are likely to con-
solidate the ethnic divisions in question.
As regards social class divisions, the melting pot hypothesis 
lacks plausibility. Childhoods are classed: children benefit 
from different types and amounts of financial, social and 
cultural capital depending on the class positions of their 
parents. Adulthoods are classed because different occupa-
tions are situated differently in the systems of economic 
production and distribution. It would be amazing if class 
differences disappeared completely during the intervening 
years. This cannot be the case, otherwise how might we 
explain persistent endogamy – the tendency for social 
equals to marry one another? (Blossfeld and Timm, 2003). 
Young people on all class trajectories may go on similar 
holidays, use the same communication technologies, con-
sume alcohol, listen to the same range of sounds, visit 
bars and clubs, and wear similar clothing. However, they 
can do all this while remaining among close friends with 
similar social origins and educational backgrounds, who are 
heading towards similar class destinations (Hollands, 2002; 
MacRae, 2004). Also, as we shall see below, individuals 
from different social class backgrounds have acquired 
different types and amounts of cultural capital prior to 
entering youth scenes, and these differences do not lessen 
as they progress towards adulthood (Nagel, 2010).
Leisure capital formation
Leisure studies’ interest in young people’s leisure is primarily 
because this life stage, along with childhood, is when indi-
viduals acquire most of their basic leisure interests, tastes 
and skills. Thereafter leisure behaviour displays impres-
sive continuities. Activities and interests may be dropped 
with which present-day young people may align, either 
long-term of just temporarily. Individuals’ alignments can 
be judged by how they dress, the pubs and clubs that 
they visit, and the music that they prefer. This evidence is 
used to suggest that we have entered a post-subcultural 
age (Bennett, 1999; Redhead, 1997; Thornton, 1995). This 
is because differences among present-day young people 
according to their styles and tastes do not map neatly 
onto social class or any other divisions. This is said to 
constitute a change since the 1960s, assuming that the 
CCCS claims about the youth cultures of that era were 
valid, which can be disputed. However, there is no dispute 
that young people are now presented with a much wider 
variety of styles. The CCCS researchers confronted a limited 
number of clearly defined youth sub-cultures. This apart, 
the post-subcultural claim rests on the observation that 
rather than pre-existing groups adopting particular styles, 
today’s styles create new “tribes”, to use Maffesoli’s (1994) 
term. The post-subcultural claim is consistent with the 
majority of young people, then and now, being unwilling 
to identify with any particular style and insisting that they 
are simply “normal” or “ordinary” rather than “spectacu-
lar”. Rather, they can express individuality by picking and 
mixing from the “market place”. Just as music can now 
be blended into hybrid sounds, so individuals can create 
their own forms of hybridity. New styles, like the old styles, 
are basically cultural constructs which can be worked on 
by pre-existing groups or by individuals (usually within 
limits that are understood and approved by their particular 
peers). Technology, the expansion of the markets, and an 
intensification of competition are all credited with a role 
in these changes, along with changes in the youth life 
stage itself.
Today’s young people typically relinquish childhood iden-
tities based on family origins many years prior to having 
adult destinations with which they can confidently identify. 
Miles (2000) claims that throughout the intervening years 
youth cultures can be a source of temporarily important 
identities. It is also possible that, in this extended youth 
life stage, divisions by class are permanently weakened, 
and gender relations are defined differently than in former 
times. Youth cultures could also act as a melting pot for 
ethnic divisions.
These claims are most plausible in relation to gender. Young 
males and females’ levels of attainment in education and 
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